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National Security Gone Too Far: Flaws in the Designation of Tier III Terrorist Organizations
Newton Portorreal*
I. Introduction
The United States has long sought to bar immigrants for their political views. After the
assassination of President McKinley in 1901 by Leon Czoglos,1 Congress provided for the
exclusion of “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence
of the Government of the United States or of all governments or of all forms of law, or the
assassination of public officials.”2 After World War I, Congress broadened the exclusionary
grounds to include the advocacy (or, membership in a group that advocates) of prohibited acts.3
In 1950, Congress expressly made membership or affiliation with the Communist Party grounds
for exclusion.4 At the same time, Congress included the broad exclusion ground for immigrants
seeking entry in order to engage in activities “prejudicial to the public interest.”5 In 1990, Congress
enacted section 601 of the Immigration Act of 1990, creating exclusion grounds for individuals
whose entries or activities might adversely affect U.S. foreign policy. 6 Today, the terrorism
exclusion grounds extend to those who are affiliated with terrorist organizations in specific ways,
and most controversially, to those who provide “material support” to terrorist organizations or
activity.7
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1
John Higham, an American historian, referred to Czoglos as “an anarchist of American birth but obviously of foreign
extraction.” JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 111 (2002).
2
Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, sec. 2, 38, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, 1221.
3
Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 251, 41 Stat. 1008, 1009.
4
Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, Title I, § 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1006.
5
Id.
6
Immigration Act of 1990, § 601. Today, the provision is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(C).
7
§ 1882 (a)(2)(B)(iv)(VI).
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Viewed in this light, Congress’ current anti-terrorist restrictions on immigration are a
natural extension in the history of exclusion grounds. In response to the new threat of foreign
terrorism, Congress enacted the Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996,
a comprehensive antiterrorism statute.8

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,

Congress enacted a variety of additional restrictions in the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act),
expanding the range of terrorism-related exclusion grounds.9 Specifically, the Patriot Act was
enacted to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world [and] to
enhance law enforcement investigatory tools.”10 Title IV of the Patriot Act, titled “Protect the
Border,” created enhanced immigration restrictions.11
Congress lengthened that list of exclusion grounds again through the REAL ID Act of
2005.12 The REAL ID Act of 2005 in fact modified the material support bar to require a petitioner,
who did in fact provide material support to a terrorist organization, to show by clear and convincing
evidence they did not know they were supporting terrorism.13 There is a vast literature regarding
the material support bar and its broad applicability.14 But material support is only one factor in
the exclusion equation—a would-be immigrant must give that material support to a terrorist
organization to fall within the exclusion ground. Given how broadly material support is defined,
loosely defining terrorist organizations can have unintended consequences.

8

Pub. L. No. 104-132.
Pub. L. No. 107-56.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Pub. L. No. 109-13.
13
Id. at § 103(a)(VI).
14
See, e.g., Teresa Pham Messer, Barred From Justice: The Duress Waiver to the Material Support Bar, 6 HLRE OFF
THE RECORD 63 (2015) (recommending solutions to the existing unjust applications of the material support bar);
Steven H. Schulman, Victimized Twice: Asylum Seekers and the Material-Support Bar, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 949 (2010)
(criticizing the broad application of the material support bar and advising practitioners on how to navigate it); Kara
Beth Stein, Female Refugees: Re-Victimized by the Material Support to Terrorism Bar, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 815
(2007) (criticizing DHS’s overly inclusive interpretation of the material support bar for its outsize impact on women
refugees).
9
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The existing statutory definition of a terrorist organization is separated into three tiers.15
Tier I terrorist organizations are “foreign organizations that pose a threat to the United States by
‘engaging or retaining the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.’”16 They
are designated by the State Department, subject to bank account freezes, criminal penalties, and
immigration sanctions, have their names published in the Federal Register and may seek judicial
review of their designation.17 Tier II terrorist organizations are “foreign organizations that engage
in terrorist activity or provide material support to further terrorist activity.” 18 They are subject to
immigration sanctions and have their names published in the State Department’s Terrorist
Exclusion List (TEL).19 Their designation may either be revoked through an order of Congress or
based upon a finding that there was a change in circumstances.20 Tier III terrorist organizations,
the focus of this comment, were also redefined by the REAL ID Act of 2005.21 They are “any
group ‘whether organized or not, [that has] a subgroup which engages in, terrorist activities.’”22
They are designated on a case-by-case basis without appearing on any central register.23
Individuals who are members or supporters of tier III terrorist organizations are subject to
immigration sanctions only.24
This Comment will argue that the existing statutory definition of tier III terrorist
organizations should either be amended by Congress or given a narrow construction by the courts.

8 U.S.C. § 1882 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)-(III) define “terrorist organization” in three ways. See infra notes 16 to 28 and the
accompanying text.
16
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)
17
8 U.S.C. § 1189.
18
Mary Orsini, Quantity vs. Quality: The Misdirected War on Immigration and the Sweeping Effects of the Tier III
Terrorist Organization, 41 RUTGERS L. REC. 167, 169-170.
19
Id. at 170.
20
§ 1189(a)(5) and (6).
21
Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103(a)(vi)(III).
22
Id.
23
Mary Orsini, Quantity vs. Quality: The Misdirected War on Immigration and the Sweeping Effects of the Tier III
Terrorist Organization, 41 RUTGERS L. REC. 167, 170–71.
24
Id.
15
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It is both over and under inclusive, inequitably barring the unsuspecting from immigration relief
while potentially allowing members and supporters of dangerous organizations repeated
opportunities to litigate their way into immigration relief.
II. Defining the Tier III Terrorist Organization
This section will interpret the statutory definition of tier III terrorist organizations,
beginning with the plain text of the statute. As per the statute, an individual may be barred from
admission to the United States for being a member of or providing material support to a terrorist
organization.25 Tier III terrorist organizations are defined as “a group of two or more individuals,
whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, [terrorist
activity].”26 However, two parts of the statute require further elaboration: what “terrorist activity”
is and what it means to “engage” in terrorist activity. This section surveys efforts by various courts
of appeals to limit the literal statutory language by focusing on the definition of “terrorist activity”
and the requirement that organizations authorize terrorist activity before it is imputed to them.

A. Terrorist Activity
Section 1182’s definition of terrorist activity is expansive.27 While a number of very
specific acts qualify as terrorist activities, this section also includes a catch-all clause: “the use of
any . . . explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal
monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals
or to cause substantial damage to property.”28 On its face, this statute makes: (1) a knife fight at a

25

§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). This sanction is applicable no matter which tier of terrorist organization the individual is
accused of joining or otherwise supporting.
26
§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)
27
§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii).
28
Id.
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bar; (2) an assault with a baseball bat over a perceived insult; and (3) soccer hooliganism where a
rock is a thrown at opposing fans, terrorist activity. It is no wonder, then, that the tier III terrorist
organization designation has been decried as barring immigration relief for association with “two
guys and a gun.”29
The Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to interpret this statute in Budiono.30 In that case,
Budiono, an Indonesian national, had his petition for withholding of removal rejected by the
immigration judge (IJ) because: (1) his application was time-barred, (2) Budiono had failed to
prove past persecution and was ineligible for withholding of removal; and, in the alternative, (3)
he associated with “Jakarta-based Muslim community group Jemaah Muslim Attaqwa (‘JMA’).”31
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Budiono’s claim was again rejected.32
The Ninth Circuit, however, disapproved of the IJ’s disposition on the alternative
grounds.33 In the proceedings below, the government had introduced evidence that the JMA was
a radical, militant Islamic group that participated in violent, anti-government riots and may have
caused at least two deaths and substantial property damage.34 JMA members assaulted Budiono
and his wife after Budiono protested the group’s militancy and renounced his membership in the
organization.35 Nonetheless, the Court insisted that the government had failed to make the
requisite evidentiary showing.36 Specifically, the government failed to make a “threshold showing

29

Maryellen Fullerton, Terrorism, Torture, and Refugee Protection in the United States, Refugee Survey Quarterly,
Vol. 29, No. 4, UNHCR (2011), p. 13.
30
Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2016).
31
Id. at 1044.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1045.
36
Budiono, 837 F.3d at 1048.
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of particularized evidence of the [terrorist] bar’s applicability before placing on the applicant the
burden to rebut it.”37
The evidentiary showing required by the Ninth Circuit in Budiono is analogous to another
immigration law concept: the persecution bar. The persecutor bar makes individuals ineligible for
asylum protection when they have “ordered, indicted, assisted, or otherwise participated in”
persecution of a person on account of a protected ground.38 In those cases, the Government must
make a sufficient evidentiary showing, as to both the “personal involvement and purposeful
assistance”39 of persecution by the individual seeking relief to raise the inference that the bar
applies.40 Only then does a rebuttable presumption in favor of applying the bar exist.41
Applying that standard to Budiono’s case, the Ninth Circuit found that the Government
had failed to make the requisite showing.42 Specifically, the Government did not introduce
evidence that the JMA ever used weapons, as required statutorily.43 Accordingly, the terrorist bar
did not apply to Budiono and he was, in fact, eligible for immigration relief.44
The Budiono Court’s statutory construction is a model for other courts to follow in this
area. The statute at issue made no explicit mention of a threshold evidentiary showing.45
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit imposed a requirement that the Government present particularized
evidence to raise the inference that the terrorist bar applies.46 By denying that such a judicial

37

Id. at 1048.
Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2006).
39
Id. at 927.
40
Id. at 930.
41
See, e.g., id.
42
Budiono, 837 F.3d at 1050.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1051.
45
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). The statute merely defines terrorist activities but does not mention the standard of
proof by which the government must support an allegation that an alien should be subject to the terrorist bar.
46
Budiono, 937 F.3d at 1049 (“to invoke the terrorist bar, it is not enough for the government simply to assert that an
individual was involved with a radical political or religious group. Rather, the record evidence must raise the inference
that each element of the bar applies.”).
38
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inference was appropriate for the IJ, the Ninth Circuit imposed a judicial limit on an unwieldy
statute. The Ninth Circuit did so by departing from the plain text to interpret terrorist activity for
the purposes of determining a tier III terrorist organization.

More courts should follow the lead

of the Ninth Circuit and other Courts of Appeal in imposing judicial limits to prevent inequitable
applications of the terrorist bar.47
B. “Engaging” in Terrorist Activity
Section 118248 classifies as a tier III terrorist organization any “group [or subgroup] of two
or more individuals” engaged in terrorist activity.49 Although terrorist activity50, defined supra in
subsection a, is relatively straightforward, courts have focused on the preceding verb: “engage.”
Take, for example, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hussain v Mukasey.51 In that case, Hussain,
a green card holder and national of Pakistan, challenged his removal order from the IJ.52 Below,
the IJ found Hussain was removable for gaining entry into the United States by fraud and for
engaging in terrorist activity.53 Hussain had previously been convicted of immigration fraud.54
On appeal, the Government agreed to vacate the judgment.55 The IJ, however, found that Hussain
gained entry by fraud by concealing his membership in Mohajir Quami Movement-Haqiqi (MQMH).56 It does not seem to be disputed that Hussain was a member of MQM-H and concealed his
membership in order to gain entry and receive permanent resident status.

47

See infra Part V
8 U.S.C. § 1182
49
§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III)
50
See supra Part II.A.
51
518 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 535.
55
Id.
56
Id.
48
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The IJ also found that Hussain was eligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT) because Hussain would likely be tortured upon his return to Pakistan.57 The IJ ultimately
entered an order of removal but stayed its effect until Hussain could be removed without
precipitating a violation of the CAT.58 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination.59 On appeal to
the Seventh Circuit, Hussain argued that the definition of a tier III terrorist organization was
impermissibly vague and created a “serious constitutional issue of fair notice.”60
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner observed the while the statute was broad, it was not
vague.61 According to Posner, whatever ambiguity exists in the statute, it exists in the provision
that requires an organization “engage” in particular activity.62 Judge Posner, however, resolved
the ambiguity by holding that “engaging” in activity as an organization depends upon authorization
of a member’s activity by the organization: “if an activity is not authorized, ratified, or otherwise
approved or condoned by the organization, then the organization is not the actor.”63 Contrasting
this theory of organizational activity to the law of agency, Judge Posner reasoned that without
authorization, an organization is not an actor.64 It may be liable for the actions of an agent, but it
cannot be said to have “engaged” in that agent’s actions.65

For Judge Posner, however,

organizations can authorize violence through their silence. Because MQM-H, specifically, “did
not criticize, or make efforts to curb . . . violence; an inference that it was authorized is

57

Hussain, 518 F.3d at 535.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 537.
61
Id.
62
Hussain, 518 F.3d at 538.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
58
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inescapable.”66 Authorization need not be formal, nor do the acts authorized need to be politically
motivated.67
The Third Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit’s lead in Uddin v. Sessions.68 In that case,
the Third Circuit took an appeal challenging the IJ and BIA’s determination that Uddin, a national
of Bangladesh, was ineligible for withholding of removal because he was a member of the
Bangladesh National Party (BNP).69 The BNP is one of Bangladesh’s two major political parties,
along with the Awami League (AL).70 Uddin alleged he was victim to various incidents of
violence at the hands of members of the AL.71
The IJ, however, denied Uddin’s claim for relief because he was a member of the BNP,
which, in the past, used violence for political purposes.72 During the 2013-14 election cycle, party
leadership announced a series of strikes and blockades.73 During these strikes, however, members
of the BNP engaged in various incidents of political violence.74 Accordingly, the IJ, and the BIA,
which affirmed, deemed that the BNP was a tier III terrorist organization.75 Crucially, however,
both the IJ and BIA failed to “discuss whether the specified terrorist acts were actually
authorized.”76 The Court subsequently held that “absent such a finding regarding authorization by
a group’s leaders, Tier III status cannot be assigned to a group.”77

66

Id.
Id.
68
870 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2017).
69
Id. at 284.
70
Id. at 285.
71
Id. at 286.
72
Id. at 287.
73
Uddin, 870 F.3d at 287.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 289.
76
Id. at 290.
77
Id.
67
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To reach this holding, the Court relied on the statutory text, the BIA’s own rulings, and the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit.78 Beginning with the statutory text, the Court noted that groups,
not merely their members, engage in terrorist activity.79 As in Hussain, the Court acknowledged
that groups engage in activity by authorizing the actions of its members.80 Further, the Court
pointed out that the BIA itself had adopted the authorization requirement in cases involving the
BNP.81 Finally, the Court explicitly endorsed Judge Posner’s analogy to agency law in Hussain.82
In concurrence, Judge Greenaway made explicit that the authorization requirement
likewise applies to subgroups.83 Judge Greenaway’s concern was that rogue members of any group
could, by clever litigators, be defined as a subgroup of the larger group and escape the authorization
requirement imposed by the Seventh and Third circuits.84 Judge Greenaway would clearly impose
limitations on which collections of members of a group can be considered a subgroup for the
purposes of determining tier III terrorist organization status.85 The BIA imposes two limits in
various cases: (1) subgroups must be significant and (2) subgroups must be “‘subordinate to, or
affiliated with, [the larger group] and the subgroup is dependent on . . . [the larger group] . . . to
support or maintain its operations.’”86 Without this limitation, the authorization requirement

78

Id.
Uddin, 870 F.3d at 290.
80
Id. (“Had the statute stated that a Tier III terrorist organization is “a group whose members engage in terrorist
activity,” then a group's Tier III designation could be based on the individual actions of its members, regardless of
authorization. But the text speaks to concerted actions of a group, not uncoordinated activities by individual members:
an organization receives Tier III status only if a group itself engages in terrorist activity.”)
81
Id. The decision did not cite any BIA precedential opinion. Instead, the panel noted that “the rule we announce
mirrors the Board's own reasoning in the mine-run of its cases involving the BNP's status as a Tier III organization”
without any citation.
82
Id. at 290–91.
83
Uddin, 870 F.3d at 292 (Greenaway, Jr., J., concurring).
84
Id. at 293.
85
Id.
86
Id. (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting BIA opinion, Dec. 16, 2016).
79
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would be toothless.87 The constitutional notice question that precipitated Hussain’s authorization
exception could be raised anew “so long as ‘subgroup’ can mean ‘members.’”88
The authorization requirement announced by Hussain and refined by Uddin are other
examples of the courts limiting the application of an extraordinarily broad statute. More courts
should adopt the particular rule announced in these cases, but more broadly, adopt a willingness
to narrowly construe tier III terrorist organizations in the spirit of equitable application of our
immigration law.89
III. Negative Effects of Tier III Designation’s Broad Reach and Failure to Provide
Standards
The facially broad language of the tier III designation is likely to swallow up organizations
that are neither a national security threat nor terrorist organizations in our ordinary language sense.
As Judge Posner recognized, “[t]errorism as used in common speech refers to the use of violence
for political ends. But the statutory definition of ‘terrorist organization’ is broad enough to
encompass a pair of kidnappers.”90 This section will lay out examples of various inequitable
applications of the tier III designation.
In Khan v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit considered the appeal of an Indian national whose
application for asylum and withholding of removal was denied by the IJ and the BIA because he
engaged in terrorist activity.91 Khan had been involved in the Kashmiri independence movement
since 1967 and, sometime in the early 1970s, began working with the Jammu Kashmir Liberation

87

Id.
Id. at 293 n. 2.
89
See infra Part V.
90
Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2008). Judge Posner continues, however, “[t]he statutory
deformation of the ordinary meaning of the word ‘terrorist’ would be a problem if people were allowed to rely, in
determining their legal obligations, on the name of a statute without bothering to read the body of the statute. They
are not.” Id. at 538.
91
584 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009).
88
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Front (JKLF).92 The JKLF had both militant and political factions; the militant faction engaged in
political violence, the political faction engaged in nonviolent advocacy for Kashmir
independence.93 Khan was involved only with the political wing of the JKLF.94 Nonetheless,
Khan admitted knowledge of the militant wing’s activities.95 The IJ decided, and the BIA affirmed,
that Khan was ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal on the basis of his affiliation with
the JKLF.96
Among other arguments, Khan contended that the JKLF was erroneously designated a
terrorist organization.97 In short, Khan argued that because the JKLF was engaged in legitimate
political resistance against the government of India, its actions were only unlawful if they violated
international law.98 The Ninth Circuit panel rejected Khan’s contention on the basis that it was
unsupported by either domestic or international law.99
Turning to the statutory text, the panel noted that the “unlawful” acts that may be deemed
terrorist activity refer unambiguously to acts deemed “unlawful in the place where they were
committed.”100 The panel further noted that Khan’s argument was belied by the discretionary
waiver provision of the terrorism bar.101 Because the executive is granted broad latitude with
waiver authority, the panel decided that the broad reading of the terrorism bar, without an
exception for resistance within the bounds of international law, was justified.102

92

Id. at 775.
Id. at 775–76.
94
Id. at 776.
95
Id.
96
Id. The IJ and BIA did hold, however, that Khan was eligible for relief under the CAT. Id.
97
Khan, 584 F.3d at 778.
98
Id. at 781.
99
See id. at 780–84.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 784 (noting that “even if [the definition of terrorist activity and the determination of refugee status] did
conflict, the administrative discretion in the INA . . . might resolve the conflict.”).
102
Id. at 782.
93
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While the Ninth Circuit’s application of the terrorism bar may well have been correct, there
is little doubt that the failure to find an exception for legitimate resistance leads to inconsistent
relief for asylum seekers who sought to defend themselves in their home countries.103 The absurd
application of the tier III designation is not lost on the courts themselves. The Third Circuit
recently noted that a failure to implement the authorization requirement might require the courts
to consider the Democratic and Republican Parties terrorist organizations.104 It is such application
that prevents members of pro-democratic groups abroad from seeking admission in the United
States.105
Just as troubling, however, is that the tier III designation is determined on a case-by-case
basis.106 This means that the same organization can be a terrorist organization in one case and not
in another. Consider the BNP, as the Third Circuit did in Uddin.107 The panel’s own research
unearthed various opinions by the BIA regarding the BNP.108 The results, to put it mildly, were
all over the map.
In six of the opinions, the Board agreed with the IJ that the BNP qualified as a
terrorist organization based on the record in that case. But in at least ten, the Board
concluded that the BNP was not a terrorist organization. In at least five cases, the
Government did not challenge the IJ's determination that the BNP is not a terrorist
organization. And in one case, the Board reversed its own prior determination,
finding that that "the Board's last decision incorrectly affirmed the Immigration
Judge's finding that the BNP is a Tier III terrorist organization." Many of the cases
discussed the BNP's terrorist status during the same time periods, reaching radically
different results.109

See Daniella Pozzo Darnell, Comment: The Scarlett Letter “T”: The Tier III Terrorist Classification’s Inconsistent
and Ineffectual Effects on Asylum Relief for Members and Supporters of Pro-democratic Groups, 41 U. BALT. L. REV.
557 (2012).
104
See Uddin v. Attorney General, 870 F.3d 282, 290 (3d. Cir. 2017).
105
See Darnell, supra, note 103 at 557 (relaying the story of Sara, a peaceful political activist in Cameroon whose
organization, seeking the independence of English-speaking Cameroon, was determined to be a tier III terrorist
organization, delaying resolution of her petition to bring her children to the United States.).
106
Uddin, 870 F.3d at 285.
107
Uddin, 870 F.3d 282.
108
Id. at 291.
109
Id.
103
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The BIA’s decisions in other cases need not be released to the public, compounding the confusion
for advocates, asylum seekers, and even IJs.110
Imagine, however, that the BNP is, in fact, an organization that poses a national security
risk to the United States. Surely, there are organizations, dangerous to the United States, whose
existence escapes the eyes of our State Department. In fact, this is exactly the scenario the tier III
designation contemplates: an organization—not designated by the State Department or Secretary
of State—that nonetheless poses a risk to national security. If Congress seeks to address the
problem of dangerous organizations not yet known to our security apparatus, the benefits of caseby-case designation of such organizations are not apparent. This flaw cries out for reform as much
as an inequitable result in any individual case. A BIA designation that a group is a terrorist
organization deserves some deference. Given the government’s very low burden of proof, such
deference is arguably inappropriate at the moment. But should the Courts of Appeal or Congress
implement some of the limits argued for infra, the BIA’s substantive conclusion that a group is a
terrorist organization may warrant creating precedential authority.
IV. The Material Support Bar and its Interplay with the Tier III Designation
Though the material support bar does not only apply to supporters of tier III terrorist
organizations, its broad applicability, combined with the facially broad definition of tier III terrorist
organizations, can result in facially inequitable results. Accordingly, understanding the material
support bar is key to understanding the concrete impact of flaws with the tier III designation. This

See Heartland Alliance Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr. v. DHS, 840 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Freedom
of Information Act does not compel the government to turn over the names of tier III terrorist organizations).
110
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section will elaborate on the content of the material support bar and summarize existing criticism
of the bar, especially in relation to its application to tier III terrorist organizations.
A. Defining the Material Support Bar
In re S-K- provides an informative application of the material support bar after its revision
by the REAL ID Act of 2005.111 In that case, respondent, a Burmese national, Christian and ethnic
Chin, faced persecution if returned to Burma, then under the control of an autocratic, military
regime.112 During her time in Burma, respondent donated money to the Chin National Front
(CNF), an organization dedicated to the freedom of ethnic Chin people.113 There was some
question as to whether, given the Burmese government’s relationship to the United States, the CNF
was in fact a terrorist organization.114 Nonetheless, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that the
CNF was a terrorist organization because it used force against and was outlawed by the Burmese
government.115
Among other things, respondent argued her support of the CNF failed to qualify as
material.116 Specifically, she argued the IJ needed to find that the funds and goods she provided
were “relevant to the planning or implementation of a terrorist act[.]”117 The BIA, however,
rejected respondent’s contention relying on the statutory text: “[the statute] requires only that the
provider afford material support to a terrorist organization.”118 It regarded such a limitation as
unworkable “where assistance as fungible as money is concerned” because even funding for an
ostensibly benign purpose allows the terrorist organization to use other funds in support of its

111

In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. 936 (BIA 2006).
Id. at 937-939.
113
Id. at 936.
114
Id. at 940.
115
Id. at 941.
116
In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. 936, 942 (BIA 2006).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 943.
112
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terrorist activities.119 Ultimately, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that respondent was ineligible
for asylum or withholding of removal owing to her material support of a terrorist organization.120
While the wisdom of the BIA’s decision may be in dispute,121 its precedential value is not.
In Hussain, Judge Posner rejected Hussain’s arguments that his fundraising did not contribute to
MQM-H’s terrorist activities, explicitly relying on In re S-K-’s reasoning.122
In Annachamy v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit rejected various arguments for exceptions to
the statutory language of the material support bar.123 Annachamy, a Sri Lankan national, appealed
the BIA’s decision to bar him from immigration relief for his material support of a terrorist
organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).124 LTTE was, during Annachamy’s
residence in Sri Lanka, a militant organization at war with Sri Lanka’s government.125 At various
times, Annachamy was detained, interrogated, and tortured by the Sri Lankan military.126
Nevertheless, Annachamy testified that he in fact opposed LTTE as they too attempted to coerce
him.127 Against his will, LTE forced Annachamy to give money to the organization and cook, dig
trenches, and build fences at a camp.128 Annachamy fled Sri Lanka and came to the United
States.129

119

Id. at 944.
Id. at 946. The BIA also ordered, however, that the IJ reconsider whether respondent was eligible for deferral of
removal under the CAT. Subsequently, respondent was granted immigration relief, first by the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, in re S-K-, 14 I. & N. Dec. 289 (AG 2007) and then by Congress, Pub. L. 110161.
121
See infra Part III.
122
Hussain, 518 F.3d at 538–39 (quoting In re S-K-, 23 I. & N. at 944).
123
733 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013).
124
Id. at 256.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 257.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 257.
120
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The Immigration and Naturalization Service, now the Department of Homeland Security,
initiated removal proceedings upon Annachamy’s arrival.130 Annachamy made claims for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.131 The IJ, finding Annachamy’s testimony
credible, granted Annachamy asylum and withholding of removal.132 The BIA, however, reversed
the IJ’s opinion on the grounds that Annachamy had provided material support to a terrorist
organization.133 On appeal, Annachamy argued that: (1) LTTE was an organization engaged in
legitimate political violence and (2) he provided support under duress.134
The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the BIA and rejected the contention that the
material support bar contained an exception either for legitimate political violence or support
provided under duress.135 On the first argument, the Court relied on the plain text of the material
support bar to undermine Annachamy’s contention that an exception existed for support of a
legitimate resistance group.136 The fatal blow to Annachamy’s argument was the concession that
LTTE was a terrorist organization.137 Because the Ninth Circuit did not find a political offense
exception in the definition of terrorist activity, it similarly declined to locate a political offense
exception in the definition of material support.138
Moving onto Annachamy’s second argument, the Ninth Circuit panel relied on textual and
structural factors in denying that a duress exception existed in the definition of material support.139
While the material support bar did not provide an explicit exception under duress, a neighboring
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subsection does, indeed, contain such an exception.140 The panel concluded that the failure to
explicitly create an exception to the material support bar, however, is evidence Congress did not
intend to create such an exception.141 Further, the material support bar’s administrative waiver
provision indicated that Congress left to the executive branch the discretion to consider whether
certain individuals were forced to support terrorist organizations against their will, or that
particular terrorist organizations had a practice of forced support.142 In short, because the evidence
weighed against finding that Congress intended a duress exception to the material support bar, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that such an exception exists.143
B. Application of the Material Support Bar
Much of the criticism around the material support bar focuses on its application to
individuals otherwise deserving of relief.144 Its effects do not neatly map onto the presumptive
goals of Congress in its enactment: keeping the United States safe from foreign terrorism. It differs
in meaningful ways from similar immigration law provisions.145 One commentator compares the
language and development of the persecutor bar, established by the Refugee Act of 1980,146 to the
material support bar.147 The material support bar and the persecutor bar both affect primarily the
same provisions of asylum law—allowing the United States to turn away refugees. While the
persecutor bar brings the United States into compliance with the United Nations Refugee
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Convention and Protocol148, the Refugee Act also allows the United States to deny entry to
refugees who pose a risk to national security.149 However, neither statutory provision contains an
explicit duress exception in its statutory text.150
Quite apart from the facial similarities these provisions share, the courts have given each
quite different treatment. For one, courts have held that the persecutor bar requires that the
government establish much more conclusively a person’s direct involvement in the alleged
persecution.151 The courts have held that the material support bar, on the other hand, is satisfied
when the government shows even a tenuous connection to a terrorist organization and need not
make any connection at all to terrorist activity.152 The government’s burden is also lower when it
needs to establish the individual’s state of mind in providing material support.153
The most important difference between the treatment of these two statutes, however, has
been the application of a duress exception to the persecutor bar but no such exception to the
material support bar. In Negusie, the Supreme Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance of
a BIA decision to apply the persecutor bar to a dual national of Eritrea and Ethiopia who was jailed
and forced to work as a prison guard by the Eritrean government.154 Below, the BIA had denied
Negusie’s application for relief by applying a categorical rule it had developed in its own case
law155 and, in the Court’s eyes, failed to “exercise[] its interpretative authority.”156 Although the
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Court did not answer the question,157 in requiring the BIA to interpret the applicability of the
persecutor bar in the first instance, the Supreme Court created some grounds for arguing that there
was such an exception, not just for the persecutor bar but for the material support bar. 158 Alas,
however, various courts of appeals have since upheld the BIA’s determination that there is no
duress exception to the material support bar.159
Interpreting the material support bar to not include a duress exception forces individuals
who were forced to provide support to terrorist organization in their home countries to rely on an
imperfect administrative waiver process.160
V. Proposals for Reform of the Tier III Designation
This section will offer some possible reforms to the scheme of tier III designation. First,
this section will detail legislative reform efforts either attempted by the legislature or
recommended to the legislature by commentators or courts. Then, this section will offer some
proposals for limited statutory interpretation and justifications of existing limits on this statute.
A. Legislative Changes
There are a number of policy reasons to change the way we define terrorist organizations:
we ensnare immigrants we do not want to bar from relief, we strengthen anti-American resentment
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abroad, and we fail in our international treaty obligations. These, however, are not reasons for the
courts to interpret the statute a particular way (or at least, not the only reasons). These are the
reasons Congress should do something about the law.
One such proposal is “the eradication of the Tier III terrorist organization given its
imprecision in targeting threats to the United States.”161 The tier III designation has done little
except “waste[] copious amounts of time and resources by investigating individuals that pose no
threat to the United States. Time and resources better spent enforcing laws denying relief to
individuals that actually pose a threat to the United States.”162
Congress has, in fact, considered such a solution. Senators Patrick Leahy163 and Carl
Levin164 introduced the Refugee Protection Act of 2010 to no avail.165 That bill proposed
eliminating the tier III designation entirely, in a section entitled “Protecting Victims of Terrorism
from Being Defined as Terrorists.”166 In proposing the bill, Senator Leahy cited the need to
recommit to and re-comply with America’s obligations under 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol.167 Unfortunately, Senators Leahy and Levin’s bill did
not become law. Today, Congress seems to have rejected the vision of limiting the exclusion
grounds and instead expanding them. Take, for instance, a bill introduced by Senator Chuck
Grassley in the 115th Congress.168 The bill’s purpose is to make “aliens associated with a criminal
gang inadmissible, deportable, and ineligible for various forms of relief.”169 While Senator
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Grassley’s bill has not seen any movement since its introduction, it does indicate two things. First,
Congress is looking to expand, not contract, the exclusion grounds. Second, it may signal that the
next perceived threat to national security Congress will seek to address is the threat of street gangs
composed primarily of immigrant members.170
Another suggestion, less radical than the outright repeal of the tier III designation proposed
by Senators Leahy and Levin is for Congress to increase the government’s burden of proof, ever
so slightly, in the removal proceedings. If Congress’ goal is to preclude real dangers to national
security from immigration relief, it should take those goals seriously. It should require the
government show that an individual has some likelihood of engaging in terrorist activity.171
Outside of the terrorism bar, such a showing is required by the government. In the Communism
bar, for instance, a former member or affiliate of the Communist Party may avoid application of
the bar if she can prove that her “membership or affiliation terminated . . . at least 2 years before
the date of such application . . . and the alien is not a threat to the security of the United States.”172
As one commentator points out, the framework for such a requirement already exists in the
terrorist activities section providing for security grounds of admissibility.173 One of the nine
enumerated grounds is that “[a]ny alien who . . . the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland
Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or likely to engage after entry
in any terrorist activity.”174 If, instead, the government were required to show an individual was

170

The Trump administration, and the President himself, seem to be fascinated with MS-13, a street gang founded in
the United States by Central American immigrants which has spread into Central America. President Trump, in an
endorsement of Virginia Gubernatorial candidate Ed Gillespie, claimed then-Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, Ralph
Northam “is fighting for the violent MS-13 killer gangs & sanctuary cities.” Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (OCT. 5, 2017, 9:58 PM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/916120435762266114.
171
See Jared Hatch, Requiring a Nexus to National Security: Immigration, “Terrorist Activities,” and Statutory
Reform, 2014 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 697, 719.
172
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(D)(i).
173
Hatch, supra, note 171 at 719.
174
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II).

23

engaged in or likely to engage in terrorist activity, then required to show one of the remaining eight
enumerated grounds, much of the tier III designation’s inequitable application could be
resolved.175 Such a requirement would operate like the two-step process barring those associated
with terrorist organizations from immigration relief.176 Such a change would also bring some
necessary consistency to the terrorism bar.
Another proposal for reform offered is to redefine terrorist activity so that it must be
unlawful under the laws of the United States and not the laws of the place the activity is
committed.177 Such a requirement would also alleviate inequitable application of the terrorism bar
in cases like In re S-K-.178 While S-K- is the touchstone in material support analysis, its holding
relied on finding that the CNF was a terrorist organization.179 That determination rested solely
upon the fact that its activities were considered unlawful by the Burmese government.180 While
the result in S-K- prompted both executive and congressional redress,181 it might have been avoided
by simply requiring the government to show that CNF’s activities would have been illegal in the
United States. If an organization’s actions would not have violated domestic law had they taken
place in the United States, then there is no basis for determining they are a national security risk.
More importantly, limiting the bar to would-be violations of domestic law allows the immigration
of members and supporters of pro-democratic groups under repressive, undemocratic regimes.
A third proposal for reform, from another commentator, is redrafting the tier III designation
to reflect a multi-factored approach geared towards excluding militant groups that are more
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squarely at odds with both domestic law and international norms.182 The first factor is whether the
organization’s purpose is political and if so, how central are its political goals to its purpose.183 Of
note is the relation between the group’s objectionable activities and its political purpose.184 A
second factor is the willingness of the group to strategically exploit the fear of noncombatants.185
This would allow for the immigration of members of groups who engage in self-defense while
targeting those objectionable few who target the innocent.186 Finally, the courts should be required
to consider whether the group engages in internationally proscribed acts of violence. 187 The third
factor, again, would allow the self-defensive use of arms and non-violent political dissent.188 On
the whole, the benefit of the multifactor approach would be to alleviate the inconsistent
classification of terrorist organizations.189
In the likely event that Congress fails to implement any statutory reform, there are
nonetheless avenues for the court to implement the narrow, limiting applications of the tier III
designation discussed in part II, supra, through the tools of statutory interpretation.
First, more courts should consider implementing the threshold evidentiary showing of
Budiono.190 For one, it is “unreasonable to expect applicants for withholding of removal and other
forms of relief to anticipate what bars might apply to their case, and then to affirmatively rebut all
of those bars.”191 When the terrorism bar is so broad, it might prove near impossible to anticipate
that the glass of water given to a stranger was material support for a terrorist organization.
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Underneath this concern, however, is the fear that meritorious claims for immigration relief are
being denied “on the basis of a vague association with religious or political fundamentalism.”192
The authorization requirement announced by Hussain193 and Uddin194 should also be
adopted by the courts. The Third Circuit argues that such a requirement “simply formalizes
common sense notions as to what a terrorist organization is.”195 Of course, violence at a rally for
President Trump would not make the Republican Party a terrorist organization. It would defy
common sense to impute to the larger organization, the Party, actions of rogue members that it did
not authorize, endorse, or even condone. In fact, because we would expect such action to draw
the Party’s condemnation, it seems especially inappropriate to hold the Party responsible in any
way. Likewise, the courts should deny that the government can merely raise evidence that
members of a group were engaged in terrorist activity and must instead show authorization for
terrorist activities by group leadership.
A necessary corollary of that rule must be a concurrent limitation of the definition of
subgroup.196 As wise as the adoption of the authorization requirement may be, if it may be escaped
by clever litigators, then it is toothless. Requiring that “subgroups” be more than “whichever
individuals committed terrorist acts”197 does not have much force on its own, but it does close the
inevitable loophole created by a focus on group authorization of member activities.
VI. Conclusion
Congress’ immigration scheme has long barred individuals from relief for their political
affiliations. From “anarchists” in the post-war period, to Communists in the cold-war period, to
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terrorists as the War on Terror reaches every corner of the globe. Now, as then, Congress is
primarily concerned with national security. Nonetheless, both Congress and the courts can
effectively address the gaping flaws of the existing terrorism bar by reigning in the application of
the tier III designation. Congress may impose a higher burden of proof upon the government, take
a multifactored approach to the designation of a tier III terrorist organization, or eliminate the tier
III designation altogether. Courts, on the other hand, may adopt the threshold evidentiary showing
of Budiono and the authorization requirement of Hussain and Uddin. The status quo is the worst
of the available options.
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